Mining Revenues. Submission to the GST Review by Jonathan Pincus
	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ








That,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠto	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinstructed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
redistribute	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotional	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠfund	 ﾠ
into	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠall	 ﾠState	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠand	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠreceipts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecades	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠdeemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdeposited.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Relates	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠto	 ﾠTerms	 ﾠof	 ﾠReference	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ(sustainability);	 ﾠ5c	 ﾠ(untied);	 ﾠ5d	 ﾠ
(predictability);	 ﾠ6b	 ﾠ(equal	 ﾠcapacity).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Advantages:	 ﾠ
1.  The	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠroyalties	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbring	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
predictability	 ﾠto	 ﾠone	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠState	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠ
2.  By	 ﾠrecognising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexhaustibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠresources,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
a.  it	 ﾠwould	 ﾠuse	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthan	 ﾠis	 ﾠcurrently	 ﾠ
employed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission,	 ﾠ
b.  it	 ﾠwould	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠStates	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsustainably.	 ﾠ
3.  It	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprevent	 ﾠa	 ﾠState	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdeciding	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠless)	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠamount	 ﾠdistributed.	 ﾠ
4.  The	 ﾠGST	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠwould	 ﾠremain	 ﾠuntied.	 ﾠ
5.  It	 ﾠwould	 ﾠremove	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisincentive	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠup-ﾭ‐front	 ﾠauctioning	 ﾠof	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠ
rights.	 ﾠ
6.  It	 ﾠcould	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠactual	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠfunds,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠeventually	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠdisplace	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotional	 ﾠfund.	 ﾠ




1.  It	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmollify	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠAustralia	 ﾠor	 ﾠQueensland	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠmaintains	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠof	 ﾠredistributing	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠequal	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠ(albeit,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠin	 ﾠtiming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠarrangement).	 ﾠ
2.  It	 ﾠ‘stands	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpremiers	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠbucket	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoney’.	 ﾠ
3.  It	 ﾠmay	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠa	 ﾠmineral-ﾭ‐rich	 ﾠState	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠall	 ﾠits	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠreceipts	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity),	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHFE	 ﾠ
arrangement	 ﾠto	 ﾠrevert	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠState’s	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
later	 ﾠyears,	 ﾠif	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠfall	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
strategy	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdiscouraged	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠwere	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠroyalties	 ﾠ
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into	 ﾠan	 ﾠactual	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠfund	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠcollectively.	 ﾠ
(The	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ‘time	 ﾠinconsistency’	 ﾠis	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdiscussed,	 ﾠbelow.)	 ﾠ
4.  It	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotional,	 ﾠretrospective,	 ﾠsovereign	 ﾠfund,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠan	 ﾠactual	 ﾠ
fund.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5.  It	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠfiscally	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠconservative,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠprices	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutputs	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠand	 ﾠrising.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠcalculating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
mineral	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠtwenty	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
estimate	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubjective,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobjective;	 ﾠand,	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepeat,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
nothing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprevents	 ﾠany	 ﾠState	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠacting	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠ
6.  It	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlow	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐
rich	 ﾠStates	 ﾠto	 ﾠapprove	 ﾠmining	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠin	 ﾠopposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠ
concerned	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠand	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠamenities:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠState	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbear	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠodium,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgain	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠits	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
revenues.	 ﾠ(If	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠapproval	 ﾠis	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠand	 ﾠreceived,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠbears	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaybe	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠodium.)	 ﾠ
7.  It	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscourage	 ﾠStates	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrequiring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠminers	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
non-ﾭ‐royalty	 ﾠexpenditures	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠtype	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHFE	 ﾠprocess;	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
doing	 ﾠso	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠroyalties,	 ﾠso	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit/cost	 ﾠratio	 ﾠ
exceeds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠState’s	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠshare.	 ﾠ
8.  The	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
actual	 ﾠpast	 ﾠspending	 ﾠpractices	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdevise	 ﾠand	 ﾠuse	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠdefinition	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘capacity’,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
consistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠreasoning.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Discussion:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠor	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠTerritories)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
main	 ﾠcomponents:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
•  GST	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠdistributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐national	 ﾠjurisdictions;	 ﾠ
•  Non-ﾭ‐GST	 ﾠgrants;	 ﾠ
•  Own-ﾭ‐source	 ﾠrevenues—taxes,	 ﾠfines	 ﾠand	 ﾠcharges,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠ
payments,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcomprise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
States.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠStates	 ﾠand	 ﾠTerritories	 ﾠown	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐soil	 ﾠresources	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠjurisdictions.	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠhorizontal	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠequalisation,	 ﾠevery	 ﾠjurisdiction	 ﾠobtains	 ﾠa	 ﾠpro	 ﾠ
rata	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠresource	 ﾠrevenue:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpooled	 ﾠresource	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
distributed	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠequal	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠ(after	 ﾠa	 ﾠshort	 ﾠtime	 ﾠlag).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠequalisation,	 ﾠredistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠ
causes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlargest	 ﾠmovements	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠequal-ﾭ‐per-ﾭ‐capita	 ﾠGST	 ﾠgrants.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
Grants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠthat	 ﾠWA	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ$3.3b	 ﾠin	 ﾠGST	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠ
year,	 ﾠafter	 ﾠ$2.5b	 ﾠin	 ﾠGST	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠwas	 ﾠredistributed	 ﾠaway	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠWA	 ﾠon	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
disproportionate	 ﾠmining	 ﾠproduction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠWA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠan	 ﾠequal-ﾭ‐
per-ﾭ‐capita	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠGST	 ﾠgrants,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠadjusting	 ﾠGST	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
mining	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠassessments;	 ﾠQueensland	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNorthern	 ﾠTerritory	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlose	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐fifth	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠmade	 ﾠunder	 ﾠEPC.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠassesses	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠtaxing	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgross	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
minerals	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠState	 ﾠ(plus	 ﾠan	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠin	 ﾠlieu	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠroyalties	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠoffshore	 ﾠwells,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠsharing	 ﾠarrangements	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commonwealth).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠ
redistribute	 ﾠownership	 ﾠof	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐soil	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrights,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠso	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠownership	 ﾠ
manifests	 ﾠas	 ﾠtaxable	 ﾠmining	 ﾠoutput.1	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠ
collectively,	 ﾠto	 ﾠfund	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfrastructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠincreased,	 ﾠdollar	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdollar,	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreceipt	 ﾠof	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠone	 ﾠyear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Royalties	 ﾠcan	 ﾠusefully	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeferred,	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmine:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠState	 ﾠowns	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset—the	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠdeposit—and	 ﾠtransfers	 ﾠrights	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠasset	 ﾠin	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreceipt	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠpayment	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠno	 ﾠnet	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠState	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheet:	 ﾠcash	 ﾠassets	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
increased,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠmining	 ﾠassets	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdecreased	 ﾠby	 ﾠlike	 ﾠamount	 ﾠ
(alternatively,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠasset	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠagreement	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
diminished).	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠan	 ﾠex	 ﾠante	 ﾠauction	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠmine	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠalter	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠState’s	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheet,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠagreed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauction	 ﾠprice	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠof	 ﾠyears.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠState	 ﾠis	 ﾠexchanging	 ﾠa	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠasset	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcash;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
same	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠcollectively.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
That	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠState	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠ
basis,	 ﾠis	 ﾠboosted	 ﾠby	 ﾠthis	 ﾠyear’s	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠpayment,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠby	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠamount	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroyalties.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexhaustibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresources	 ﾠinvolved,	 ﾠmany	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠargue	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠresources	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠdifferently	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠrevenue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠregard	 ﾠall	 ﾠcash	 ﾠreceipts	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmining	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠState	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠshould	 ﾠplan	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
‘permanent’	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠNorway	 ﾠdeposited	 ﾠits	 ﾠoil	 ﾠ
revenues	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ‘sovereign	 ﾠfund’,	 ﾠand	 ﾠspends	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠgenerated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfund.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠan	 ﾠunsustainable	 ﾠcash-ﾭ‐funded	 ﾠ‘splurge’	 ﾠin	 ﾠexpenditure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠneed	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠa	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenue	 ﾠthan,	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtourism	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠmethodology	 ﾠhas	 ﾠrecently	 ﾠ
moved	 ﾠa	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠway	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheet	 ﾠapproach.2	 ﾠA	 ﾠtreatment	 ﾠof	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠsheet	 ﾠor	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘permanent	 ﾠincome’	 ﾠ
stream	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate’s	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠcapital.3	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠof	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠcapital,	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠresources.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCGC	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠmethodology	 ﾠis	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ‘policy	 ﾠneutral’:	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ
production	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠunevenly	 ﾠdistributed	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠby	 ﾠWA	 ﾠto	 ﾠraise	 ﾠits	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠ
rates	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAustralian-ﾭ‐average	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠclaimed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
‘average’	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠor	 ﾠmining	 ﾠtax	 ﾠrate	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠWA’s	 ﾠtax	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
slightly	 ﾠmysterious	 ﾠways:	 ﾠsee	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠUren,	 ﾠ‘State’s	 ﾠ“own	 ﾠgoal”	 ﾠover	 ﾠroyalties’,	 ﾠThe	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠ
newspaper,	 ﾠMay	 ﾠ21-ﾭ‐22,	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠMore	 ﾠstrictly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCGC’s	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplemented	 ﾠby	 ﾠcalculating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠlending	 ﾠa	 ﾠState	 ﾠwould	 ﾠneed	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠits	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠyear	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠworth	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaverage,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠthe	 ﾠyear	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsame	 ﾠnet	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠworth	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠas	 ﾠother	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ(CGC	 ﾠ2010:60).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠNations	 ﾠDevelopment	 ﾠProgram	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmethodology	 ﾠfor	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠ‘natural	 ﾠcapital’.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠapply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ‘Hartwick	 ﾠrule’,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠrents	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinvested.	 ﾠFirstly,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
GST	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠState	 ﾠdecides	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠattributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ
revenues:	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepeat,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGST	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠremain	 ﾠuntied.	 ﾠSecondly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotional	 ﾠfund	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠperpetual	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHartwick	 ﾠrule).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Hartwick	 ﾠrule	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠproductivity	 ﾠimprovements	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠendogenous	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠAustralia)	 ﾠand	 ﾠembodied	 ﾠin	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠphysical	 ﾠor	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
capital;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠor	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐increasing	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠscale.	 ﾠThird,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠmineral	 ﾠrents	 ﾠare	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠby	 ﾠgovernment—some	 ﾠremain	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ
companies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown.	 ﾠFourth,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrents	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
captured	 ﾠby	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠtaxation.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
governments	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠplanned	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcaptured)	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpure	 ﾠrents.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Time	 ﾠinconsistency	 ﾠ
Just	 ﾠas	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠHartwick	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdanger	 ﾠof	 ﾠ	 ﾠ‘time	 ﾠinconsistency’	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
proposal	 ﾠmade	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠalluded	 ﾠto	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠand	 ﾠthird	 ﾠdisadvantages	 ﾠlisted	 ﾠ
earlier,	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠfurther.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠGST	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠremain	 ﾠuntied,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠmade	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠAny	 ﾠState	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
decide	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠits	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
mining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠless);	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthose	 ﾠStates	 ﾠearning	 ﾠmining	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠabove	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnational	 ﾠaverage,	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcash	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbank	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
finance	 ﾠ'excessive'	 ﾠrecurrent	 ﾠspending;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠothers	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠborrow	 ﾠor	 ﾠsell	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠassets.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠburden	 ﾠof	 ﾠabstention	 ﾠon	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
States,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtemptation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Say	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠAustralian	 ﾠGovernments	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠscheme	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmining-ﾭ‐rich	 ﾠStates	 ﾠspend	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
invest	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠAssume	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠyear,	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ
revenues	 ﾠfall	 ﾠfar	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity.	 ﾠThen	 ﾠany	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠprofligate	 ﾠ
States	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠfall	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstream	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfall	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
gap	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdiminished	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ
receipts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinancial	 ﾠcrisis	 ﾠor	 ﾠserious	 ﾠhardship	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
States,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGST	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmodified,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠother	 ﾠ‘rescue’	 ﾠpackage	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdevised.4	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠ‘emergency	 ﾠ
response’	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠto	 ﾠinstruct	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGST	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠ
arrangement	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrevert	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠmethod	 ﾠof	 ﾠredistributing	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ
revenues	 ﾠwhenever	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠfall	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠarrangement,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠfall,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠso	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠincome	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠStates,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠfall	 ﾠis	 ﾠshared	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠarrangement,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfall	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐set	 ﾠof	 ﾠStates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhad	 ﾠspent	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpast	 ﾠshares	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
annuities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠspent	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠHorizontal	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠ
equalisation	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐mining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠitself	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠharder	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠState	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsufficiency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Practical	 ﾠoperation:	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠStates	 ﾠwould	 ﾠagree	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotional	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠfund,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
calculation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrolling,	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠannuity;	 ﾠif	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommonwealth	 ﾠTreasury	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠdevise	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdistribute	 ﾠthat	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠEPC	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Effects	 ﾠof	 ﾠ‘discounting’	 ﾠCGC’s	 ﾠ2009-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠmining	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠby	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐third	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ NSW	 ﾠ Vic	 ﾠ Qld	 ﾠ WA	 ﾠ SA	 ﾠ Tas	 ﾠ ACT	 ﾠ NT	 ﾠ
Grants	 ﾠ
Commission	 ﾠ
($b)	 ﾠ 14.5	 ﾠ 11.0	 ﾠ 8.7	 ﾠ 3.3	 ﾠ 4.4	 ﾠ 1.7	 ﾠ 0.9	 ﾠ 2.5	 ﾠ
Alternative1	 ﾠ
($b)	 ﾠ 14.0	 ﾠ 10.4	 ﾠ 9.1	 ﾠ 4.2	 ﾠ 4.3	 ﾠ 1.7	 ﾠ 0.8	 ﾠ 2.5	 ﾠ
Percentage	 ﾠ
difference2	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐3.1	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐5.6	 ﾠ 4.6	 ﾠ 25.4	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.9	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.5	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.8	 ﾠ 0.9	 ﾠ
Note	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠrecommendations	 ﾠless	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐third	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠmining	 ﾠredistributions.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmining	 ﾠredistribution	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠ$3.8b	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ$2.5b.	 ﾠ
Note	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠPercentage	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠwere	 ﾠcalculated	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠwere	 ﾠrounded.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠan	 ﾠindication	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
notional	 ﾠfund	 ﾠat	 ﾠ$37b,	 ﾠas	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2009-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠ(using	 ﾠ5	 ﾠper	 ﾠcent	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
consonant	 ﾠ20-ﾭ‐year	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠfactor).5	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ2009-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠannuity	 ﾠwould	 ﾠthen	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
$2.5b,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ40	 ﾠper	 ﾠcent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠ2009-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
$6.5b,	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐thirds	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠredistributed	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠon	 ﾠmining.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠa	 ﾠrough	 ﾠindication,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠGST	 ﾠgrants,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠthat	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠa	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐third	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2009-ﾭ‐10	 ﾠmining	 ﾠ
revenues	 ﾠadjustment	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠWA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ$0.9b	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠGST	 ﾠgrants	 ﾠ(that	 ﾠis,	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐third	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
$2.5b	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠas	 ﾠWA’s	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠin	 ﾠgenerating	 ﾠ
mining	 ﾠrevenues),	 ﾠthan	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission’s	 ﾠlatest	 ﾠrecommendations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠredistributing	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues,	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
amount	 ﾠin	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠof	 ﾠaround	 ﾠ$4b	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcredited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotional	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠfund	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
future	 ﾠredistribution	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequal-ﾭ‐per-ﾭ‐capita	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠamong	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ$4b	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ$6.5b	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ2009-ﾭ‐10,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ$2.5b	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdistributed	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠproposal.	 ﾠ
Of	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ$4b,	 ﾠWA	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ‘contribute’	 ﾠ$1.9b.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Therefore,	 ﾠif	 ﾠWA	 ﾠwisely	 ﾠdecided	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ$1.9b	 ﾠof	 ﾠcash,	 ﾠits	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠrevenues	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspending	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠyear	 ﾠwould	 ﾠactually	 ﾠfall,	 ﾠby	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ$1b	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ
per	 ﾠcent);	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠfall	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠ$4b	 ﾠcredited	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotional	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠfund.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠa	 ﾠState’s	 ﾠannual	 ﾠbudget	 ﾠproposes	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠper	 ﾠcapita	 ﾠannuity,	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠits	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠ
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5	 ﾠGlenn	 ﾠPure	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGrants	 ﾠCommission	 ﾠkindly	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmining	 ﾠrevenues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
profligacy.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresource-ﾭ‐rich	 ﾠ
States	 ﾠto	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠactual	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠfunds	 ﾠto	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠroyalty	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlike;	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠStates	 ﾠto	 ﾠset	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfund.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠprecedent	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Commonwealth	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠ
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